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PAYMENT TO INNOCENT HOLDER OF
FORGED CHECK
By G. M. SHELDON*
A case interesting to bankers and business men generally, re-
garding the rights of parties in cases of forged bank checks, has
been decided by Judge Reid in the Circuit Court at Merrill.
Pearl Reake made an exchange of automobiles with H. H.
Roehrborn, a garageman, and gave in exchange a check on the
Bradley Bank purporting to be signed by Rudolph Ott for
$250.0o. R6ehrborn immediately. cashed the check at the bank
and immediately thereafter the bank made demand on Roehrborn
for a return of the money claiming that the check was a forgery.
Roehrborn refused to return the money and the bank charged the
$25o.oo against the checking account at the bank. Roehrborn
then sued to recover the money. The case was submitted to a
jury which decided by its special verdict that the check was a
forgery but that Roehrborn had exercised due care in accepting
the check from Reake. The check was issued on July 3o, en-
dorsed to Roehrborn on August 2 and cashed by him on August
3. The principal question in the case was whether, under the
circumstances, Roehrborn was a holder in due course.
Judge Reid in his opinion concludes that, the jury having
acquitted the plaintiff of any negligence or obligation to further
inquiry into the genuineness of the check than he did, there re-
mains only the question whether he became a holder of the check
in due course, and entitled to the benefit of the rule laid down
that a drawee bank paying a check to holder for value, in due
course, who is without negligence or notice that the drawer's
signature is forged, cannot recover back the money paid when it
is discovered that the check is a forgery.
No decision of the question in Wisconsin has been found, and
apparently this state is free to adopt the rule deemed to be the
soundest. Upon first impression it seemed to the court that the
holder of the check, in endorsing and presenting it for payment,
warranted the genuineness of all preceding signatures and that
under the principle that money.paid upon mistake of fact might
be recovered back. The rights of the drawee bank were superior
to the last holder who received payment. But, under the Uni-
*Member of Tomahawk, Wisconsin, Bar.
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form Negotiable Instruments Law, only a person negotiating
commercial paper warrants that the instrument is genuine and in
all respects what it purports to be. It is entirely clear that a
holder who presents a check for payment does not negotiate it,
and that the. drawee bank in paying it does not become a holder
in due course.
It appears that the check in question was four days old when
it was negotiated to the plaintiff Roehrborn. It is clear that a
reasonable time for presentation of the check for payment at
the bank had elapsed but the authorities of other states and of
the supreme court of the United States will support a conclusion
that such delay in presentment, as occurred in this case, would
not make the check overdue when negotiated to the plaintiff. In
the light of these authorities the court held that the check here
in question was not overdue when the plaintiff received it and
that the plaintiff must be deemed a holder in due course. Plaint-
iff should recover the $250.00 withheld from him.
In view of the importance of the question involved the opinion
of Judge Reid is here set out in toto.
STATE OF WISCONSIN, IN CIRCUIT COURT, FOR LINCOLN COUNTY
H. H. ROEHPBORN, Plaintiff, vs. BRADLEY BANK, Defendant,
and RUDOLPH OTr, Impleaded
Opinion
The plaintiff conducts a garage and the defendant a bank in
the city of Tomahawk, and the impleaded defendant, Ott, is
and was a depositor at the bank and resided about 15 miles from
the city of Tomahawk. On August 2, 1923, one Pearl Rieke
bargained with the plaintiff for an exchange of automobiles upon
which Pearl Rieke was to pay a difference of $2IO, and there-
upon, after banking hours, negotiated to the plaintiff a check on
the Bradley Bank purporting to be signed by Ott and running-
to Pearl Rieke as payee. Before receiving the check, plaintiff,
after business hours, inquired of the Cashier of the bank whether
a check of Ott for $250 would be good at the bank, and upon
receiving an affirmative answer, plaintiff accepted the $250 check,
delivered the car which he gave in exchange, and paid Pearl
Rieke $4o in cash. On the following morning, at the opening of
the bank, plaintiff presented the check for payment, and it was
paid.
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The jury have found, on evidence presenting a jury issue, that
the check was a forgery. The bank was notified on the very day
that it made payment that Ott claimed the check to be a forgery,
and notice was immediately given to the plaintiff and payment
by the plaintiff to the bank of the amount of the check was de-
manded. Thereafter, the bank charged the amount of the check
to the open account of the plaintiff at the bank, and thereby col-
lected it. Plaintiff now seeks to recover the amount so charged
to him.
The check was dated July 30, 1923. The purported payee,
with her husband, lived in the vicinity of the residence of Ott.
They had no fixed place of abode. The plaintiff first saw them
about a week before August 2. They were in his place of busi-
ness, as he testified, frequently during that week, looking at
second-hand cars, buying gasoline, etc. The check was negotiated
to the plaintiff about six o'clock P. M., August 2. It was pre-
sented for payment and paid in cash on the following morning,
and was charged back by the bank to the plaintiff's account later
in the same day. Between the time of payment and the time
when the check was charged back the plaintiff's position was not
changed to his disadvantage. Pearl Rieke and the car she re-
ceived, both disappeared quite promptly after the trade.
In addition to finding the check a forgery, the jury found,
upon evidence reasonably warranting their conclusions, that the
plaintiff was not guilty of negligence in accepting the check with-
out further inquiry, as to its validity, and that he had no knowl-
edge or notice of facts which should have put him upon further
inquiry as to the genuineness of the check.
Usually, the issue raised in this action between the plaintiff
and the bank has, in other cases, arisen where the bank was the
plaintiff seeking to recover back from the last holder the amount
which it paid to such holder on the forged check. However, this
reversal of the parties plaintiff and defendant does not seem to
affect the determination of the issue. If the bank, under the
circumstances, could not have recovered back from Roehrborn
the amount it paid him on the forged check, it cannot now hold
the funds of plaintiff on deposit to satisfy such a demand on the
part of the bank.
The great weight of authority, including the courts of hizhest
standing and weight, adhere to the rule that a drawee bank pay-
ing a check to holder for value, in due course, who is without
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negligence or notice that the drawer's signature is forged, cannot
recover back the money paid when it is discovered that the check
is a forgery. This rule has been applied even where the drawee
bank could not be said to have been actually negligent in failing to
discover the forgery at the time when the check was presented
for ,payment.
The rule is recognized to be apparently, if not actually, in con-
flict with the principle that money paid under mistake of fact
may be recovered back. In some cases it is spoken of as an ex-
ception to that rule. In some cases it is based upon the maxim
that as between two innocent and non-negligent parties, the loss
sustained must remain where it was placed by the payment of
the forged check. In some cases it is said that the drawee bank
has or should have at hand absolute means .of determining
whether the signature of its customer is forged. In still other
cases it is held to be a rule of necessity for the protection of com-
mercial paper and of those who deal in it, and that in view of the
use of this class of paper as money, it was considered that public
policy required that, as between the drawee and good faith holders,
the drawee bank should be deemed the place of final settlement
where all prior mistakes and forgeries should be. corrected and
settled once for all, and if not then corrected, payment should
be treated as final.
There are decisions challenging the correctness of the fore-
going rule and holding to the contrary, but they are vastly in the
minority.
No review of the authorities which the court has consulted
will be attempted here. They are too numerous to be reviewed
except in an extended treatise and we will be content here by re-
ferring to extended note 12 A. L. R. io89; 5 R. C. L. 558; U. S.
vs. Chase Nat. Bank, 40 S. C. Rep. 361; Bank vs. Bank, I4
A. L. R. 479, 197 Bac. 547; in which last mentioned case the
question was considered in connection with the Uniform Ne-
gotiable Instrument Law, and the authorities are quite fully re-
viewed.
No decision of the question in Wisconsin has been found, and
apparently this state is free to adopt the rule deemed to be the
soundest.
Upon first impression it seemed to this Court that the holder
of the check in endorsing and presenting it for payment, war-
ranted the genuineness of all preceding signatures, and that under
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the principle that money paid upon mistake of fact might be re-
covered back, the rights of the drawee bank were superior to the
last holder who received payment. But under the Uniform Ne-
gotiable Instrument Law, only a person negotiating commercial
paper warrants that the instrument is genuine and in all respects
what it purports to be. (Sec. 1677-5 & 6.)
It is entirely clear that a holder who presents a check for pay-
ment does not negotiate it, and" that the drawee bank in paying
it does not become a holder in due course.
And the reasons given for making such a situation as is here
presented an exception, if it be an exception to the general rule,
that money paid on a mistake of fact might be recovered back,
seem sound and sufficient.
The rule stated which denies to a drawee bank which has paid
a forged check the right to recover back payment must, how-
ever, be restricted to its proper limits. The holder receiving
payment must, as we have seen, have been free from negligence,
and free from knowledge of any facts reasonably tending to show
infirmity in the instrument; in fact, free from any deception
or bad faith on his part,'and above all, must be a holder in due
course.
For example, the payee named in a check must be presumed
to have had absolute means of knowledge whether the same was
genuine and would not be entitled to the same protection as a
later holder who was a bona fide endorsee for value.
The jury having acquitted the plaintiff of any negligence or
.obligation to further inquire into the genuineness of the check
than he did, there remains only the question whether he became
a holder of the check in due course and entitled to the benefit
of the rule laid down.
The plaintiff's position seems to meet all the calls of Sec.
1676-22 of the Negotiable Instrument Law, unless it be held that
under Sec. 1676-23 the lapse of time between the date of the
check and the date of its negotiation to the plaintiff was an un-
reasonable length of time and that therefore it was in effect
over-due when the plaintiff received it. This presents a difficult
and delicate question.
The statute provides (Sec. 1675) that in determining what is
a reasonable time or unreasonable time, regard is to be had to the
nature of the instrument, the usage of the trade or business, if
100
PAYMENT TO INNOCENT HOLDER OF FORGED CHECK
any, with respect to such instruments and the facts of the par-
ticular case.
A check is a bill of exchange drawn on a bank, payable on
demand, and must be presented for payment within a reasonable
time after its issue, or the drawer will be discharged from liability
thereon to the extent of the loss caused by the delay. (Sec.
1684-I & 2.)
It must be noted that this relates to presentment for payment
and not to negotiation. A reasonable time for negotiation of a
check may be different from a reasonable time for presentment
of it to the bank for payment. So too, the statute prescribes the
penalty for delay beyond a reasonable time in presenting a check
for payment, which penalty is discharge of the drawer from
liability, wholly or pro tanto, in case of loss.
The rule is well settled in Wisconsin that where the payee of a
check resides and receives a check at the place where the bank
is located, a reasonable time for presentment for payment ends
at the close of the banking hours of the day succeeding the re-
ceipt of the check, excluding sundays and holidays. (Grange vs.
Reigh, 93 Wis. 552.)
And if the bank upon which the check is drawn is at another
place, the check must be forwarded to the place of payment on
the next business day and presented at latest upon the day follow-
ing its receipt at the place of payment. Aebi vs. Bank, 124 Wis.
73, 77. Gifford vs. Hartner, 88 Wis. 528.
This rule is very well established and prevails almost uni-
versally. The object of it is to fix the place where the loss falls
in case the bank fails while the payee or an endorsee is unneces-
sarily delaying in presenting the check t6 the bank for payment.
It by no means determines what is a reasonable time for nego-
tiation of a check in order that the endorsee may become a holder
in due course.
No decisions in Wisconsin have been cited or have been found
by the court which squarely determines the question. The only
case which approaches a discussion of it is Columbian Banking
Co. vs. Bowen, 134 Wis. 218. But that case does not deal with
a bank check, but does deal with a draft drawn by one bank upon
its correspondent bank in a distant town and sold to its customer
for the purpose of making a remittance. It was, therefore, not
affected by Sec. 1684-2.
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The draft was forwarded by the drawer bank to the payee by
mail and promptly endorsed and forwafded by the payee to
Spokane, Washington, for the purpose of making a remittance.
Its first negotiation was thus clearly within a reasonable time.
The endorsee appears to have held it twenty-four days before
selling it to a bank in California. After such transfer there was
no unnecessary delay in presentation for payment.
While the Court discusses several sections of the Negotiable
Instrument Law, it did not consider the question whether the
holding of the draft by the endorsee for a period of twenty-four
days before selling it to the California Bank extended over an
unreasonable length of time, nor whether on that account the
California Bank could not become a holder in due course. No
reference is made in the opinion to Sec. 1676-23. The case was
made to turn upon the question whether the presentment for
payment was made within a reasonable time after the last negotia-
tion in accordance with Sec. 1678-1. This statute was made to
control the decision. We cannot, therefore, give this case much
weight in determining the question before us.
A check is a bill of exchange payable on demand. Its purpose
is, however, different from that of a demand bank draft and it
differs still more from a promissory note payable on demand. A
draft is intended for the purpose of remittance to some distant
place and is expected to go through various channels of exchange
before being presented for payment. A demand note is intended
as an extension of credit until such time as the payee shall de-
sire payment and so notify the maker. While demand of pay-
ment must be made within a reasonable time in order to continue
the note as live commercial paper, such reasonable time might be
very much longer than the time that would be deemed reasonable
for the presentment of a draft for payment; and in turn, the time
reasonable for the presentment of a draft might be much longer
than that reasonable for the presentment of a check. A check
usually is intended only for local use to transfer the deposit of
the maker to the credit of the payee or his endorsee.
Still the lapse of such time between making of the check and
presentation for payment as would discharge the drawer in the
event of failure of the bank in the meantime does not necessarily
make the check over-due and in effect dishonored before its pre-
sentment for payment. Demand of payment and refusal to pay
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is necessary to make the check over-due, unless such demand has
been unreasonably delayed.
It appears here that the check in question was four days old
when it was negotiated to the plaintiff. The payee named in it,
while not residing in Tomahawk, did reside in the vicinity. To
the knowledge of the plaintiff she was in the city of Tomahawk
between the date of the check and the time of its negotiation to
him, and therefore he knew that she could have presented the
check for payment in the meantime. She appears to have been
in plaintiff's place of business during banking hours of the day
when plaintiff received the check. It is clear that a reasonable
time for presentation of the check for payment at the bank had
elapsed. But the authorities of other states and of the Supreme
Court of the United States well support a conclusion that such
delay in presentment as occurred in this case did not make the
check over-due when negotiated to the plaintiff. 8 C. J. 413,
notes 51, 52 & 53. Bull vs. Kasson Bank, 31 S. C. R. 97; 123
U. S. 1o5. Fealey vs. Bull, (N. Y.) 57 N. E. 631. CitizenIs
Bank vs. Cowlen, (N. Y.)"73 N. E. 33- Johnson vs. Harrison
(Ind.) 97 N. E. 931. Estes vs. Lovering, (Minn.) 6i N. W. 674.
While these decisions are not made in construing the Uniform
Negotiable Instrument Law, and do not refer to any statute
similar to our Sec. 1676-23, it seems to be clear that our statute
is merely a codification of the common law on this question.
In the light of these authorities this court must hold that the
check here in question was not over-due when the plaintiff re-
ceived it, and on the findings of the jury and the undisputed facts,
he must be deemed a holder in due course.
For the reasons above stated plaintiff should recover judgment
for the $250 withheld from him, and interest and costs.
Dated November 2, 1923.'
A. H. REID, Judge.
See article "Defenses against a Holder in Due Course," 5 MARQUETTE
LAw REVIEW 7 r.-Ed.
